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ONE FOOT IN THE DOOR: 
EVIDENCE-BASED LIMITS ON THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE 
Sofia Ranchordás1 
(forthcoming in the peer-reviewed journal Hukim—Journal of Legislation, special issue on the 




Legislative entrenchment or the long-term persistence of legislation has been associated with ineffective and 
obsolete laws. This position has nonetheless underestimated the natural bias towards the status quo that 
characterizes our legal order and the difficulty to terminate existing policies and laws. In this Article, I argue 
that the long-term stability of legislation only becomes a problem when it impedes the passage of new—and, in 
many cases, more effective—legislation. This Article aims to make two central contributions. First, it 
scrutinizes the legal and non-legal forces behind this problem. Second, it explains how temporary legislative 
measures should be employed to correct for the negative effects of legislative entrenchment. This Article 
suggests two ways in which these instruments may facilitate legislative reform. First, temporary legislative 
instruments (e.g., sunset clauses) can be employed as consensus-gathering mechanisms regarding legislative 
changes that might face initial opposition. Second, they can be employed as evidence-based mechanisms which 
promote research on available legislative alternatives. I contend that temporary legislative instruments such 
as sunset clauses, pilot programs, and state policy experiments should be used to produce evidence of the 
effectiveness of new legislation and rationalize the lawmaking process. This evidence-based approach can 
contribute to the disentrenchment of ineffective legislation and operate as a counterweight against certain de 
facto entrenchment forces.  
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Julian Eule’s seminal article “Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: 
Entrenchment and Retroactivity” made a first serious attempt to explore the multiple dimensions 
of legislative continuity and in particular, of legislative entrenchment.2 Eule scrutinized the 
phenomenon of legislative entrenchment and explained why the prohibition against retroactivity 
was rooted in the temporal limits placed on legislative power.3 Until then, the long-term 
persistence of legislation had not occupied much of the legal literature.4 Instead, the longevity of 
legislation was interpreted by civil law scholars as a pillar of the principle of legal certainty.5 In 
the common law world, the analysis of legislative entrenchment had been lurking “beneath the 
surface the debates surrounding such issues as impairment of contract, legislative vetoes, budget-
balancing legislation, constitutional amendment procedures”.6 Drawing on Eule’s work, this 
article aims to contribute to this analysis by providing a more complete perspective on legislative 
entrenchment. This Article examines how temporary legislation, particularly sunset clauses and 
experimental legislation, might offer an evidence-based correction for the negative effects of the 
long-term persistence of legislation.7 Sunset clauses, that is, dispositions that are terminated on a 
                                                     
2 Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 379 (1987). 
3 See more recently FRANK FAGAN, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: TEMPORARY VS. PERMANENT 
LEGISLATION (2013) (providing a law and economics analysis of the legislative process and analyzing the 
complexities of limiting the legislative mandate by employing sunset clauses). 
4 See also Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L. J. 189, 191 
(1972); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. 
L. Q. 185, 196-201 (1986). 
5 See H. A. OLDENZIEL, WETGEVING EN RECHTSZEKERHEID: EEN ONDERZOEK NAAR DE BIJDRAGE VAN HET 
LEGALITEITSVEREISTE AAN DE RECHTSZEKERHEID VAN DE BURGER (1998); PATRICIA POPELIER, RECHTSZEKERHEID 
ALS BEGINSEL VAN BEHOORLIJKE WETGEVING (1997); For a comparative perspective see James R. Maxeiner, Legal 
Certainty: A European Alternative to American Indeterminacy?, 15 TULANE J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L. 541, 559-61 
(2006).  
6 Eule, supra note 2 at 383. 
7 See also Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard McAdams, Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, 
beforehand determined date and laws with a temporary and experimental character may assist the 
legislator in the task of exploring new and more effective legislative paths.8  
The term “entrenchment,” that is, the process conducive to the long-term persistence of 
legislation, has received a negative connotation in the literature.9 Nevertheless, the entrenchment 
of legislation is not necessarily a problem in itself as long as it does not stand in the way of 
legislative effectiveness and allows for the partial renewal of legislation in light of new policy, 
economic, and developments and evidence.10 Legislative entrenchment becomes challenging 
when it impedes lawmakers from reforming ineffective laws and replacing them by evidence-
based provisions. Therefore, the legislative mandate should be limited not only by future 
majorities as Eule suggested in 1986 but in particular by future evidence that shows that there are 
more effective responses to the underlying problem.  
The literature has explained that social and bureaucratic entrenchment forces as well as 
path dependence might close the door to positive change and legislative reform.11 In this article, I 
analyze this problem and argue that the use of temporary legislative instruments might help 
legislators “get one foot in the door” since they can be employed as consensus and evidence-
gathering instruments. 
This Article suggests two ways in which temporary instruments may facilitate legislative 
reform: first, temporary and experimental dispositions can operate as consensus-gathering 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and Temporary Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 291 (2014) (arguing that temporary measures can be adequate instruments 
to disrupt path dependence and secure legislative or regulatory change). 
8 For a thorough analysis of the definition and history of sunset clauses, see ANTONIOS KOUROUTAKIS, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE OF SUNSET CLAUSES: A HISTORICAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS (2017). 
9 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L. J. 1665 
(2002). 
10 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L. J. 1665 (2002) 
(defending the constitutionality of legislative entrenchment and its potential benefits). 
11 Lily Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies, 65 ALA. L. REV. 187 (2013) (arguing that tax subsidies for 
home sales rest upon questionable policy justifications, and contending that these questionable decisions are justified 
by path dependence and bounded rationality); 
mechanisms regarding legislative changes that might face initial opposition; second, these 
instruments can be employed as evidence-based tools to initiate further research on novel 
legislative alternatives.12 Temporary legislative instruments can be particularly useful to promote 
the partial renewal of legislation when there is initial aversion to policy or legislative 
termination. In these cases, sunset clauses, pilot programs, and experimental legislation may 
facilitate the gathering of consensus among those who oppose legislative reform because they 
“only” introduce temporary changes.13The enactment of temporary legislation offers a 
compromise between opposing views as these measures make the promise of temporality and 
renewed legislative oversight since they expire unless they are actively renewed.14 The 
opponents of legislative reform often trust that legislative inertia and other forces will later 
reverse this temporary legislative change to the previous status (quo).15  
Drawing on Ginsburg/Masur/Adams, I argue that temporary legislative measures can be 
used to disrupt existing legislative paths and institute new and evidence-based path-dependent 
institutions.16 I acknowledge that this evidence-based approach also has its deficiencies and may 
be subject to political and interest groups capture.17 Evidence-based instruments aim to offer an 
informed alternative path to existing legislation and, above all, a process to rationalize 
                                                     
12 Alvin E. Roth, Introduction to Experimental Economics, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 3 
(Alvin E. Roth & John Kagel, eds., 1997) (arguing that lawmakers should “search for facts,” promote dialogues 
between politicians and theorists, and “whisper” the results of this process “in the ears of politicians.”). 
13 Richard C. Kearney, Sunset: A Survey and Analysis of the State Experience, PUB. ADMIN. REV. 49, 55 (1990); 
see also John Ip, Sunset Clauses and Counterterrorism Legislation, PUB. L. 74, 75 (2013) (analyzing the rationale 
of sunset clauses in the context of counterterrorism legislation).  
14 Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard McAdams, Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and 
Temporary Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 291 (2014) (arguing that temporary measures can be adequate instruments to 
disrupt path dependence and secure legislative or regulatory change). 
15 See, e.g., Forrest Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of the Law, 52 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 252, 255 (2008) (describing sunset clauses as “substantial vehicles for encouraging a law to be revisited 
… and build coalitions.”); see my previous work SOFIA RANCHORDÁS, CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND 
EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION 194-195 (2014). 
16 Ginsburg, Masur & McAdams supra note 7 
17 See Mark A. Lemley, Faith-based Intellectual Property, 62 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1328 (2015) (analyzing the 
complexities of the now widely available but often contradictory evidence on different aspects of IP law).  
legislation, rather than a solution. This Article indicates the need for greater attention to 
evidence-based lawmaking,18 that is, the development of a body of law based on facts gathered 
on a systematic basis in an attempt to find the most effective solution for a given problem.19  
This article is organized as follows: in the first part, I provide a brief explanation of why 
laws last and become entrenched even when they are no longer effective. I then suggest a 
solution for this problem: the enactment of temporary legislative instruments. I explain why and 
how a temporary or experimental approach can correct for the negative effects of legislative 
entrenchment by explaining the functions of temporary instruments. In Part II, I provide an 
overview of these functions. In Part III, I underline the relevance of perceiving evidence as a 
limit to the legislative mandate, by examining the literature on evidence-based lawmaking. Part 
IV concludes with the potential shortcomings of this approach.  
 
I. WHY LAWS COME TO LAST 
 
At first blush, the idea of longstanding statutes that are difficult to change appears to 
stand in deep contrast with the more recent discussions regarding the need to improve the quality 
of legislation and ensure that legislative provisions are based on sound evidence rather than 
determined by politics.20 The legal literature has, nonetheless, not provided a thorough analysis 
of the factors conducive to the continuity of laws and their subsequent entrenchment or how to 
disentrench ineffective laws.  
                                                     
18 See my previous work Sofia Ranchordás, The Whys and Woes of Experimental Legislation, 1 THEORY & 
PRAC. OF LEGIS. 414 (2013). 
19 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349 (2011); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-based Law, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2011). 
20 Ibd. 
In this Part, I examine the main forces that determine the long-term persistence of 
legislation, I explain why legislative entrenchment can become a problem, and I introduce a 
possible corrective approach. 
 
A.  Entrenching a Statute 
 
The long-term persistence of legislation is commonly attributed to legislative inertia.21 
The process of entrenching a statute is nonetheless more complex as it results from a myriad of 
political or social forces that impede Congress from modifying an existing statute. The long-term 
persistence of legislation is often associated with the potential of statutes to establish a legacy 
and generate legal predictability.22 In theory there are two set of legal and non-legal mechanisms 
that can be employed to achieve the long-term entrenchment of a statute: de jure or formal 
entrenchment provisions that limit explicitly the ability of the legislator to amend or repeal a 
statute (e.g., an eternity clause); and de facto entrenchment, that is, a set of social, political, and 
economic circumstances that make legislative reform difficult to operationalize in practice. 
Formal or de jure legislative entrenchment refers to the persistence of legislation as a 
result of the enactment of either statutes or internal rules that limit future amendments, for 
example, by prescribing voting rules.23 By precluding or limiting legislative change, legislative 
entrenchment evokes the image of the “dead hand of the law.”24 This type of entrenchment is 
                                                     
21 Abbe R. Gluck, Symposium Issue Introduction: The Law of Medicare and Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 15 (2015) (mentioning “the well-known, institutionalized inertia of the legislative 
process. In the nation’s libertarian tradition, Congress is structured to make legislation difficult.”). 
22 Forrest Maltzman, Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of the Law 52 (2) AM. J. OF POL. 
SCI. 252 (2008). 
23 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L. J. 1665, 1667 
(2002). 
24 See, e.g., Yaniv Roznai, Towards a Theory of Unamendability, NYU Public Law and Legal Theory Working 
Paper (2015), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1515&context=nyu_plltwp; Michael W. 
McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127-1128; (1998), Michael J. 
commonly accepted in constitutional documents but it is considered to be countermajoritarian 
when it is included in ordinary legislation.25  
In practice, legislative entrenchment does not result from “dead legal forces” but rather 
from living legal and non-legal factors. As Professor Vermeule explained, while first degree 
murder rules have persisted longer than a number of laws and policies that are often qualified as 
entrenched statutes (e.g., the 1965 Social Security Act establishing Medicaid and Medicare), this 
does not necessarily mean that the Congress’ hands are tied regarding the amendment of such 
rules. There are no signs here of de jure entrenchment clauses. In this case, those rules have 
remained because “people like them” and they are deemed to be still reasonably effective. 26 That 
is, the long-term persistence of legislation is not by itself a negative phenomenon as long as the 
core of this statute remains effective. 
The “popularity” of a law is not the only reason why legislation might endure. In this 
Section, I refer to the role played by three entrenchment forces: path dependence, bureaucracy, 
and cognitive biases. In these cases, the long-term persistence of legislation is not motivated by 
the effectiveness of statutes but rather by cognitive biases and institutional obstacles. 
 
1. Path Dependence 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 382 (1997); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008). 
25 For a thorough analysis of de jure entrenchment in the constitutional context, see YANIV ROZNAI, 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS (2017). 
26 Vermeule, supra note 8 (“The reason, however, is not that such statutes are super or can be described as 
“constitutional” in any interesting or useful way. It is just that almost everyone wants there to be statutes against 
murder, so there is not and never will be a majority to repeal them. At a minimum, statutes that are de facto 
entrenched and statutes that rest on the support of (large) current majorities will be observationally equivalent in 
many cases.”) 
Path dependence theory seeks to explain how the different phases of a historical process 
are connected.27 It is a model developed in social sciences that explains how previous and current 
decisions and institutions influence past and future political and legislative decisions.28 More 
than just resorting to the cliché that “history matters”, path dependence theory seeks to explain 
how the different phases of a historical process are connected.29 According to this framework, 
different types of past and present inertia, vested interests, switching costs, and the notion of 
embeddedness tend to explain current and future minimal changes.30 This is aggravated by the 
existence of procedural and institutional arrangements, the build-up of behavioral routines, and 
cognitive structures around existing institutions.31  
Path dependence constrains future decisions because first, existing institutions (and 
networks of institutions) are crucial for the development of new solutions and reforms.32 These 
institutions pave the way for the implementation of a policy and create the necessary conditions 
to establish, for example, a functioning health system. “Institutional stickiness” is an important 
pillar of the persistence of (particularly formal) institutions and public policies.33 Institutions or 
                                                     
27 Dilan Riley & Juan Fernández, Beyond Strong and Weak: Rethinking Postdictatorship Civil Societies, 120(2) 
AM. J. OF SOC. 432, 503-493 (2014). 
28 In the economic literature, see, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. 
REV. 332 (1985); Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions the 'Carriers of History': Path Dependence and the Evolution 
of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE & ECON. DYNAMICS 205 (1994) (analyzing 
three insights that explain path dependence in economic phenomena: the role played by historical experience in 
forming mutually consistent expectations; resemblance between highly durable capital assets and the information 
channels and codes required by multi-person organizations, the interrelatedness among the constituent elements of 
complex human organizations and the constraints on choices about particular rules and procedures, resulting from 
pressures to maintain consistency and compatibility). 
29 Dilan Riley & Juan Fernández, Beyond Strong and Weak: Rethinking Postdictatorship Civil Societies, 120(2) 
AM. J. OF SOC. 432, 503-493 (2014). 
30 John Bell, Path Dependence and Legal Development, 87 TUL. L. REV. 787, 797. (2012); Page see supra note 
146, at 88; Janet E. Frantz, The High Cost of Policy Termination, 20 INT’L J. OF PUB. ADMIN. 2097 (2007). 
31 See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
(1990). 
32 Id. at 67. 
33 Gerard Alexander, Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation, 13 J. OF THEORETICAL 
POL. 249, 259 (2001) (arguing that formal institutions can be predictable platforms for democratic consolidation but 
emphasizing that "institutional stickiness" is not always present, since some formal institutions can be changed with 
simple legislative majority). 
any other structures that frame a certain policy path simplify the decisionmaking process of 
citizens and politicians, by providing viable (even if suboptimal) alternatives. 
Common law systems are known for their tendency to facilitate path dependence.34 This path 
dependence means, for example, that past judicial decisions and legislation will shape or even 
determine present outcomes or decisions.35 An important distinction between path dependence in 
economic markets, legislature, and courts is that the first can interrupt path dependent processes 
if a new set of economic conditions or political consensus emerge, whereas courts are more 
strongly dependent on existing judicial paths.36 Path dependence theory has also been employed 
to explain the evolution of law beyond judicial lawmaking in a number of fields of law.37  
Path dependence supports the argument that legal development is influenced not only by 
external social and economic forces but also by the internal and historical dynamic of the law.38 
When law is construed upon different legal institutions and small legal contributions, the theory 
of path dependence will sentence disruptive legal change to rejection—except under critical 
                                                     
34 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167, 186 (1920) (mentioning the tendency of common law to embrace path dependence). For a comparative legal 
study on the ‘slowness’ in legal change in civil and common law jurisdictions, see Rafael La Porta & Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285, 286-87 
(2008) (arguing that “legal origins or the beliefs and ideologies become incorporated in legal rules, institutions, and 
education and are transmitted from one generation to the next”). 
35 Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law 
System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 101, 104 (“Path dependence” means that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and 
systematic ways by the historical path leading to it. It entails, in other words, a causal relationship between stages in 
a temporal sequence, with each stage strongly influencing the direction of the following stage."). 
36 See Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law: Employment Cases in the United States and the 
European Union, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 116, 121 (2010) (“a key difference between path dependence in courts, 
markets and legislatures is the existence of correctives. Both economic and political markets contain mechanisms to 
interrupt path-dependent processes; such mechanisms are much more limited in judicial systems”). 
37 Hathaway, supra note 35, at 106. (“The doctrine of stare decisis thus creates an explicitly path-dependent 
process. Later decisions rely on, and are constrained by, earlier decisions”); See, e.g., Lily Kahng, Path Dependence 
in Tax Subsidies, 65 ALA. L. REV. 187 (2013) (arguing that tax subsidies for home sales rest upon questionable 
policy justifications, and contending that these questionable decisions are justified by path dependence and bounded 
rationality); Amitai Aviram, Path Dependence in the Development of Private Ordering, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 29 
(2014). On judicial path dependence, see FRANCESCO PARISI, THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING 97 (2009); Jef de 
Mot, Bias in the Common Law, in PRODUCTION OF LEGAL RULES 131, 138-139 (Francesco Parisis ed.,) (discussing 
the bias towards the status quo on the grounds of the judicial path-dependence); Ginsburg, Masur & McAdams, see 
supra note 7, at 296 (arguing that temporary legislation may be preferable to permanent legislation in order to 
guarantee a transition from a path-dependent but suboptimal regulation to a more efficient outcome). 
38 Bell, supra note 30, at 787. 
conditions, because the costs of legal change are greater than the benefits.39 When a new 
problem arises, law does not start out with a blank slate, even when new phenomena arise. 
Instead, lawyers tend to fit them within existing categories.40  
Considering the path-dependence constraint, policy and legislative changes tend to be 
incremental. In 1959, Charles Lindblom explained how policymakers “muddle through” new and 
old facts in order to formulate new policies, developing incremental changes and seeking more 




The negative impact of bureaucracy and red tape on the quality of legislation and policy has been 
well-documented in the legal literature.42 Public policy and political science literature have also 
identified the connection between policy perpetuity and bureaucratic obstacles.43 In this Section, 
I address the relationship between these insulation mechanisms and the longevity of legislation 
and policy programs. 
Bureaucratic instruments are employed to insulate agencies, policy programs, and, to a 
certain extent, statutes from political pressure, political turnover, and new evidence. Empirical 
evidence has demonstrated that in the United States, agencies that have been insulated from 
                                                     
39 Id. at 790. 
40 Id. at 792. 
41 Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV.79, 84 (1959). 
(“democracies change their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps 
and bounds.”) 
42 See, e.g., Martin Lodge, High-Quality Regulation: Its Popularity, Its Tools, and Its Future, 29 PUB. MONEY & 
MGTM. 145 (2009); Wim Voermans, The Sisyphus Paradox of Cutting Red Tape and Managing Public Risk: The 
Dutch Case, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 128 (2008). See generally on the relationship between bureaucrats, politics, and 
lawmakers, CATHY MARIE JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND LEGISLATORS 
(1992). 
43 See, e.g., Robert P. Biller, On Tolerating Policy and Organizational Termination: Some Design 
Considerations, 7 POL’Y STUDIES 133 (1976); Garry D. Brewer, Termination: Hard Choices—Harder Questions, 38 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 338 (1978). 
political turnover are substantially more durable than non-insulated agencies.44 Independent 
agencies, that is, non-partisan agencies which are governed by administrators serving for fixed 
terms, are the typical example of politically insulated agencies. 
 Insulation from future politics and movements of change often implies the delegation of 
enforcement powers to agencies—particularly, independent agencies. This typically increases the 
probability of legislative entrenchment after elections. On the one hand, legal scholars have 
traditionally assumed that administrative agencies are durable and almost impossible to 
terminate.45 The legislature controls agencies in the structure and process framework of their 
decisions by imposing procedural requirements that stack the deck in favor of certain interests. 46 
These procedural requirements tend to endure. Political actors are then able to control the extent 
of representation of various interests in administrative process and stack the deck in favor of 
certain beneficiaries.47 That is, Congress determines what decisions are made and when, by 
establishing the decisionmaking process at their outset. Deck stacking not only generates 
information and facilitates monitoring but it can also partially shelter policies from future repeals 
or amendment attempts.48  
Besides delegation to independent agencies, other elements may also contribute to the 
political insulation of policy programs and the agencies implementing them. If legislation is 
                                                     
44 DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL 
INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, 1946-1997 157 (2003). 
45 See, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES 309 (1979) (“Once an agency is established, its resources favor its own survival, and the longer 
agencies survive, the more likely they are to continue to survive.”). 
46 Jacob Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC 
LAW 333, 342 (Daniel Farber & Anne J. O’Connell eds., 2010). 
47 Matthew McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control, 3 J. OF LAW, ECONOMICS & ORG. 243 (1987). See also Matthew McCubbins, Roger G. Noll 
& Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political 
Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1987) 
48 Patashnik & Zelizer, supra note 15 (“A major threat to a policy is that the coalition that enacted it may be 
replaced by a future coalition that opposes it. One solution is to “stack the deck” by creating institutions that make it 
harder to damage the program in the future.”). 
sufficiently rich in substantive content, contains statutory deadlines, and opts for precise 
language, the predictability of agencies decisions, and the political control over the 
implementation of a statute might be extended in time.49 In conclusion, the creation of 
bureaucratic obstacles that endure beyond the legislator that established them, is susceptible of 
impeding change as once an agency has been created and has achieved a certain degree of 
autonomy, the influence of political turnover or new evidence might impede legislative reform. 
 
3. Cognitive biases 
 
Resistance to legislative change is justified not only at the collective but also at the individual 
level in light of natural cognitive limitations and our natural human bias towards the status quo. 
Under uncertain conditions, social science literature has argued that people do not tend to update 
their preferences in light of incoming information and give preference to the solution they are 
familiar with.50 Cognitive pathologies might occur in the legislative process, for example, when 
legislative actors resist to legislative change in virtue of cognitive biases, even when change is 
supported by empirical studies or is the most rational option. In the last decades, different 
theories of regulatory and legislative pathology have analyzed how legislation and regulation are 
made and what interests they serve.  
Theories of cognitive psychology have demonstrated that regardless of how well-
motivated human decisionmakers are, they are influenced by cognitive dissonances such as 
                                                     
49 See Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now,” 103 GEO L. J. 157 (2014) (discussing the 
deferral of agency decisions in time). 
50 Jones, supra note 124, at 307 (“People are “incomplete Bayesians.” In uncertain situations, they do not 
update their choices in light of incoming information about the probability of outcomes in the manner predicted by 
calculations from probability theory.”). See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and 
Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341 (1983); Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
existing reasoning paths and frameworks.51 Cognitive dissonance is an important but overlooked 
element in the literature that can explain individual resistance to legislative change and 
consequently, the bias toward the status quo or path-dependent solutions.52 The analysis of 
cognitive dissonance suggests that people resist change because “they attempt to be consistent 
with their attitude toward a known event.” 53 When they find themselves acting in a way that is 
inconsistent with their attitude, they experience tension and attempt to reduce this tension and 
return a state of cognitive consistency by resisting change.54 This explains why individual 
lawmakers might resist to reform, even when confronted with a more effective legislative 
solution. This cognitive bias is another de facto entrenchment force that requires a thorough 
understanding of the cognitive limitations experienced by lawmakers.55 
 
B.  Why Legislative Entrenchment Can Be a Problem 
 
As the previous Section described, politics, path-dependent institutions, the need to maintain 
existing benefits or simply an individual bias towards the status quo can provide a partial 
explanation for the long-term persistence of legislation. Moreover, the process of terminating 
                                                     
51 William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 616 (2002) (“cognitive psychology does not even constitute a body of learning telling us what 
agent will do; it only tells us that agents will fall short of whatever it is they pursued.”). See also Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 84 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
52 Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the 
Law's View of the Decision-making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65 (1999) (arguing that legal commentators, 
politicians, and the public maintain positions on juvenile crime which are no longer supported by empirical 
evidence). See also Sara Sun Beale, What’ Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Non-
Legal Factors, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997) (discussing the disconnection between public opinion regarding 
criminal law and psychological and social research). 
53 See LEON FESTINGER, THE THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); Elliot Aronson, 
Dissonance theory: progress and problems, in THEORIES OF COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY: A SOURCE BOOK 
(R. Abelson et al., eds, 1968). 
54 Johnny Jermias, Cognitive Dissonance and Resistance to Change: the Influence of Commitment Confirmation 
and Feedback on Judgment Usefulness of Accounting Systems, 26 ACCOUNTING, ORG. AND SOC. 141 (2001). 
55 See Andrew Jay McClung, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 
32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389 (1991) (applying cognitive dissonance to police behavior and advocating the use of 
dissonance persuasion techniques already known in the treatment of substance abusers). 
laws and policies involves considerable costs to prevent damage to local communities, 
institutions, employed staff, and constituencies.56 The legal criticism of legislative entrenchment 
reveals nonetheless the underlying perspective that legal reform should favor the disappearance 
of law.  The idea that each legislature should be free to legislate and amend almost every single 
piece of legislation is nonetheless unrealistic. In this context, it is important to inquire why 
legislative entrenchment should in some cases be qualified as a problem.  
First, policy and legislative persistence becomes a “problem” when there are no rational 
reasons to maintain a policy in place.57 This occurs, for example, when suboptimal policies are 
not timely terminated or when they become superfluous because the problem they aimed to 
address no longer exists.58  
Second, the entrenchment of ordinary legislation becomes problematic when it constrains 
future majorities in a particular way against their will.59 In the next Part, I propose a solution for 
this problem: the implementation of temporary legislative measures and suggest that these 
instruments can be “the one foot in the door” of legislative reform. 
 
II. THE ONE FOOT IN THE DOOR EFFECT 
 
In this Part, I shed light on what I call “the one foot in the door effect”. This effect is a metaphor 
for the role played by temporary measures in the legislative process. Because they only promise 
temporary and reversible reforms, they facilitate the process of giving the first step to change the 
                                                     
56 See Janet E. Frantz, The High Cost of Policy Termination, 20 INT’L J. OF PUB. ADMIN. 2097 (2007) 
(discussing the costs of termination in the health care sector). 
57 Iris Geva-May, When the Motto is ‘Till Death Do Us Part’: The Conceptualization and the Craft of 
Termination in the Public Policy Cycle, 24 INT'L J. OF PUB. ADMIN. 263 (2001) (discussing the difficulty in 
terminating policies and the tendency of policies to persist). 
58 See MARK R. DANIELS, TERMINATING PUBLIC PROGRAMS: AN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
PARADOX 31 (1997). 
59 Dennis F. Thompson, Democracy in Time: Popular Sovereignty and Temporal Representation (2005) 12 
CONSTELLATIONS 245, 255 (2005). 
status quo. Once the first step is given, new entrenchment forces capture the new (albeit 
temporary) disposition. As this Part explains, this concept also translates a frequent reality in 
Parliaments: Sunset clauses are often passed, but rarely followed through.60  
This Part examines the role of temporary legislation and experimental policymaking in 
promoting legislative and policy reform by explaining the typical functions of temporary 
legislative instruments and emphasizing how they have been employed in the recent past to 
gather consensus and overcome resistance to legislative reform. This Part starts with two 
illustrations of the “one foot in the door effect”: Kendra’s law and the USA Patriot Act. In both 
cases, new legislative measures were introduced on a temporary basis as a reaction to tragic 
events. These statutes survived more than a decade and were renewed several times.61  
Temporary legislative measures such as sunset clauses and pilot programs were originally 
enacted in the 1970s to perform anti-entrenchment functions, that is, to terminate unnecessary 
and increasingly powerful agencies and their regulatory programs.62 However, as this Part 
shows, temporary measures have been used in some cases either to disentrench suboptimal 
institutions and entrench new ones or to adopt new and rather controversial legislative reforms. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, sunset clauses do not always tend to expire at the end of a 
certain period. Instead, they can be easily renewed and contribute to the long-term persistence of 
new and sometimes more effective legislation. When “one foot is in the door,” the presence of 
                                                     
60 See David A. Fahrenthold, In Congress, Sunset Clauses Are Commonly Passed but Rarely Followed Through, 
WASH. POST. (December 15, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-congress-sunset-
clauses-are-commonly-passed-but-rarely-followed-through/2012/12/15/9d8e3ee0-43b5-11e2-8e70-
e1993528222d_story.html.  (“Outdated laws were piling up. Bad ones weren’t being fixed. So lawmakers turned to 
‘sunset clauses’ — expiration dates forcing Congress to reconsider old laws before they disappeared.”) 
61 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Some of the dispositions of the USA 
Patriot Act were incorporated in the USA Freedom Act after the former finally expired in 2015. 
62 See Mark B. Bickle, The National Sunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 209 (1985). 
certain de facto entrenchment forces such as the ones analyzed in Part I might guarantee that the 
“door remains open.”  
 
A.  Kendra’s Law 
 
In 1999, Kendra’s law amended the New York Mental Hygiene Law and introduced forced 
outpatient treatment on a temporary basis.63 The New York State created in this context the 
Assisted Outpatient Treatment Program, a new and temporary program authorizing court-ordered 
treatment for people with severe mental illness. This amendment was introduced following the 
brutal murder of Kendra Webdale who was pushed to an oncoming train by a psychiatric 
patient.64 Although forty-five states nowadays permit assisted outpatient treatment of psychiatric 
patients, this approach has remained controversial in the medical community in the last decades.65 
The Medical Mental Association, the literature, and numerous activists have opposed this coerced 
treatment, arguing that Kendra’s law violates the autonomy of the mentally ill by imposing 
coercive treatment.66 In 2010, a study also demonstrated that although assisted outpatient 
                                                     
63 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 9.60 (McKinney 2015). 
64 Ilissa L. Watnik, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra's Law: New York's Solution for Treatment of the 
Chronically, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2001). 
65 See Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessing Kendra’s Law: Five Years of Outpatient Commitment in NY, 56 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 791 (2005). Assisted outpatient treatment or outpatient commitment is court-ordered 
treatment (including medication) for individuals with severe mental illness who have a medical history of 
medication noncompliance. Assisted outpatient treatment is not allowed in five states: Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
New Mexico, Maryland, and Tennessee. Typically, violation of the court-ordered conditions can result in the 
individual being hospitalized for further treatment. 
66 See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, Blurring the Lines of the Danger Zone: The Impact of Kendra's Law on the 
Rights of the Nonviolent Mentally Ill, 16 NOTRE DAME J. OF LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173, 180 (2002) ("The 
potential for abuse is made all the more likely because of the many individuals who may, under Kendra's Law, 
petition for the involuntary outpatient commitment of a mentally ill person."). Erin O’ Connor, Is Kendra’s Law a 
Keeper? How Kendra’s Law Erodes Fundamental Rights of the Mentally Ill, 11 J. L. & POL’Y 313 (2002); New 
York Civil Liberties Union, Legislative Memo: Kendra's Law Bills to Curtail Individual Liberty Unconstitutional, 
NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/content/legislative-memo-kendras-law-bills-curtail-individual-liberty-
unconstitutional. For an overview of the different perspectives, see Pam Belluck, Program Compelling Outpatient 
Treatment for Mental Illness is Working, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/us/program-compelling-outpatient-treatment-for-mental-illness-is-working-
treatment produces benefits for the community and the patients, there was insufficient evidence to 
support the expansion of the program.67 
 Kendra’s law was originally due to sunset five years later but it was renewed on different 
occasions. This law was not in itself a novelty since it had been inspired by a similar pilot 
program that aimed to change the Mental Hygiene Law to include a form of forced outpatient 
treatment.68 In the past decade, the renewal of the new and temporary section remained 
problematic, despite the several independent studies and evaluations of the effectiveness of 
Kendra’s law partially counterbalancing the opposition with evidence of the benefits of this 
law.69 In 2010, legislators were asked to make Kendra’s law permanent, but the section of the 
N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law was only extended until 2015.70 At the time of writing, Kendra’s law 
is on the verge of becoming permanent with a new bill passed on March 26, 2018, by the New 
York State Senate.71 In spite of the legal and medical controversies and the lack of consistent 
evidence regarding its effectiveness, the sun does not seem to set on Kendra’s law.72  
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67 Jo C. Phelan & Marilyn Sinkewicz, Effectiveness and Outcomes of Assisted Outpatient Treatment in New 
York State, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 137 (2010) (“Assisted outpatient treatment is a “package deal” that includes 
coerced treatment but also access to enhanced services. We cannot conclude which of these elements of the package 
deal contributed most to the generally positive outcomes for participants. We therefore caution against using our 
results to justify an expansion of coercion in psychiatric treatment.”). 
68 Kristina M. Campbell, Blurring the Lines of the Danger Zone: The Impact of Kendra's Law on the Rights of 
the Nonviolent Mentally Ill, 16 NOTRE DAME J. OF LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173, 176-180 (2002) (comparing 
Kendra’s law and the 1994 Pilot Program). 
69 MARVIN SWARTZ, HENRI SWANSON ET AL., NEW YORK STATE ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT PROGRAM 
EVALUATION (2009), available at http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/aot_finalreport.pdf; Columbia Mailman School 
of Health, Outpatient Care for Individuals with Severe Mental Illnesses Reduces Crime, February 10, 2010, 
available at https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/public-health-now/news/outpatient-care-individuals-severe-mental-
illnesses-reduces-crime. See also OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, KENDRA’S LAW—FINAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF 
ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT (2005). 
70 The legislators’ hesitation was motivated by the lack of clarity regarding the key issue of voluntary vs. 
involuntary psychiatric treatment and the troubling disparities in the law's implementation across the state. 
71 New York State Senate, Press Release: Senate Passes Measure to Make Kendra’s Law Permanent, N.Y. State 
Senate, March 26, 2018, at https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/fred-akshar/32618-senate-passes-
measure-make-kendras-law-permanent (accessed on March 29, 2018). 
72 Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60 Assisted outpatient treatment. New York State Kendra’s Law (due to sunset in 
2015). See Kathryn A. Worthington, Kendra's Law and the rights of the mentally ill: an empirical peek behind the 
courts' legal analysis and a suggested template for the New York State Legislator's reconsiderations for renewal in 
 Kendra’s law is not an isolated example of the reiterated renewal of temporary 
provisions. Rather, research has demonstrated that this was particularly common in the 1980s, 
when a “sunset boom” emerged in a number of states.73  
 
B.  USA Patriot Act 
 
The USA Patriot Act is an example of the power of political momentum, the dialectic of terror 
and emergency legislation, and the power of temporary legislative measures to trigger successive 
reauthorizations. At a time when a firm and rapid reaction to the September 11 attacks was 
required, the USA PATRIOT Act was “rushed” and passed in Congress without following the 
usual legislative procedure.74 The necessity of the intrusive measures included in this act, their 
efficacy, costs and benefits were not analyzed on a systematic basis.75 The USA Patriot Act was 
therefore accused of breaking with well-established legal paradigms and notions of checks and 
balances between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the government.76 But its 
most controversial dispositions were temporary and invited future legislative oversight, 
convincing the most skeptical voters to accept the temporary measures.77 If these measures 
                                                                                                                                                                           
2010, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 213 (2010). 
73 See Ranchordás, supra note 15, at 20-21, 194-195 (2014). See also Landon Curry, Politics of Sunset Review 
in Texas, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 58 (1990) (analyzing the “sunset boom” in the 1980s in a number of states and the 
frequent renewal of sunset clauses). 
74 Kim C. Wong, The Making of the USA Patriot Act I: The Legislative Process and Dynamics, 34 INT'L J. OF 
THE SOC. OF L. 179 (2006); see also Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145 (2004) (describing the lawmaking process of the USA Patriot Act). 
75 Kim C. Wong, supra note 74, at 179. 
76 Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security with Privacy Under the USA Patriot Act, 
80 DENV. U. L. REV. 375, 379 (2002) (“The Patriot Act attacks the balance between the government and the 
individual by a systematic circumvention of established doctrine and procedures guarding against unreasonable 
government intrusion.”). 
77 Susan N. Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 67, 68 (2006). See USA Patriot Act § 224(a) for a list of the Title II permanent provisions. Not surprisingly, 
the USA Patriot Act passed in the Senate on October 25, 2001 with a large majority, with Democrats and 
Republicans voting in favor of the bill. 
would not be explicitly reauthorized, they would expire. This renewed reconsideration and 
legislative debate appear to convey the idea that sunset clauses reinforce political accountability 
and promote the separation of powers.78  
 A number of the USA Patriot Act sunset clauses were renewed or converted into 
permanent dispositions in the past decade.79 In 2015, this process of renewals came to an 
apparent halt. On May 31st, 2015, a number of key provisions of the USA Patriot Act including 
the “lone wolf”, “roving wiretap” provisions, and section 215 expired.80 This last one was 
particularly controversial since it authorized the NSA to collect the phone records of millions of 
U.S. citizens who were not suspects in terrorist activities. On May 31st, the Senate was not able 
to reach an agreement to avoid the expiration of these provisions and reauthorize them. The 
sunset provisions passed away in the midst of intense debate but they did not fall into oblivion. 
Rather, they lived on in the USA Freedom Act which was enacted in June 2015, showing that 
once the first foot is in the door, the way might be open. 
 
C.  Functions of Temporary Legislative Instruments 
 
                                                     
78 Adam Klein, The End of Al Qaeda? Rethinking the Legal End of the War on Terror, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV.1865, 1905 (2010). 
79 The USA Patriot Act was meant to be extinguished in 2005, but in 2005 some of its sections were converted 
into permanent ones, others were extended until 2010 by the USA Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act. See Christian van Stolk & Mihaly Fazekas, How Evaluation Is Accommodated in Emergency Policy Making, in 
EVALUATION AND TURBULENT 161 (Jan-Eric Furubo, Ray C. Rist, Sandra Speer, eds). 
80 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (providing that various 
authorities granted by the Act expire on December 31, 2005). The temporary provisions are: sections 201 
(wiretapping in terrorism cases), 202 (wiretapping in computer fraud and abuse felony cases), 203(b) (sharing 
wiretap information), 203(d) (sharing foreign intelligence information), 204 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
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215 (FISA access to tangible items), 217 (interception of computer trespasser communications), 218 (purpose for 
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In the last centuries, legislation is said to have lost “its dignity” in both common law and civil 
law jurisdictions.81 In 1901, Simeon Baldwin famously declared that “statutes [had] no roots. 
[They] spring often from temporary emergency. They are hastily and inconsiderately adopted, 
and serving well or ill their immediate purpose, may fall into desuetude.”82 As the previous 
examples show, not much has changed since then: both Kendra’s law and the USA Patriot Act 
have indeed stemmed from emergencies, resulting from defective lawmaking processes and 
lasted beyond the initial emergency that justified it.83 Although many of its dispositions were 
originally meant to be temporary and introduced as novel, controversial, and extraordinary 
powers, they were renewed on several occasions. Similarly to other sunset clauses, after each 
renewal, the promise of temporality was made, giving the impression that these intrusive 
provisions would “hurt a little bit less”.84 As the following sections explain, temporary 
legislative instruments are nonetheless meant to promote other legislative functions including 
offering prompt responses to emergencies and limiting extraordinary powers in time, achieving 
consensus regarding legislative reform, and gathering evidence. 
 
1. Respond to Emergencies 
 
                                                     
81 JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999) (analyzing the reasons why legislation has been 
criticized in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, and offering a framework that attempts to reestablish its 
dignity). 
82 Simeon Baldwin, Introduction, in YALE LAW SCHOOL FACULTY, TWO CENTURIES' GROWTH OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1701-1901 at 1, 6 (1901). 
83 Adrian Vermeule, Emergency Lawmaking After 9/11 and 7/7, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155 (2008) (the claim of 
defective process relies on the circumstances of emergency lawmaking.). 
84 Chris Mooney, A Short History of Sunsets, 2004 LEGAL AFF. 67, 68 (2004) (providing an overview of the use 
of sunset clauses since the 1980s and explaining that there is a tendency to renew sunset provisions and trying to use 
such clauses to gather the consensus of opponents: “once “a weapon for good-government reformers has been 
reduced to a spoonful of sugar that helps controversial legislation go down.”) 
 Sunset clauses have been typically employed in the context of emergency legislation to 
restrict extraordinary powers, promote legislative oversight and political accountability, and 
avoid that the “state of emergency” would be converted in a “state of normalcy.”85 These are 
some of the rationales invoked to justify the inclusion of multiple sunset clauses in the USA 
Patriot Act enacted in the wake of the September 11 attacks.86 Contrary to natural catastrophes or 
other crises that justify the enactment of emergency and temporary legislation, terrorism is not a 
temporary problem.87 There are moments of higher and lower risk for a country, but terrorism is 
an old and enduring problem.88 Nevertheless, the inclusion of sunset clauses in the USA Patriot 
Act influenced a number of countries in Europe to adopt temporary dispositions in the context of 
the 2008 financial crisis and in their counterterrorism policies.  
 
2. Gather Consensus 
 
 
Temporary legislative instruments can allow legislators to gather consensus by suggesting non-
permanent solutions with the promise of policy reversibility. The adoption of sunset clauses 
postpones taking final decisions. Sunset clauses are thus a “snoozing button”89 which first helps 
legislators replace old by new rules. However, if they are not followed through, they may 
contribute to the entrenchment of the new rule in the long-run. Since the threshold for enacting a 
                                                     
85 See Alan Greene, Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European 
Court of Human Rights 12 GERMAN L. J. 1764 (2011).  
86 See John E. Finn, Sunset clauses and Democratic Deliberation: Assessing the Significance of Sunset 
Provisions in Antiterrorism Legislation 48 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 442 (2010) (providing a thorough analysis 
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87 Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: The Disturbing Prospect of War without End, 2 J. OF 
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88 See BOB BRECHER, ET AL, DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF TERRORISM: INTERROGATING TERROR 3 (2010). 
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temporary provision is usually lower than that of a lasting one, the opponents of a new provision 
tend to accept more easily legislative change.90 From a theoretical point of view, this is a rational 
choice since if no legislative debate occurs, the provision will simply expire. Therefore, the most 
skeptical voters presuppose that legislative inertia, an entrenchment force, will impede the 
entrenchment of temporary and possibly excessive and controversial measures, unless they are 
renewed. In theory, this is a correct starting point but it assumes that any legislative renewal 
would presuppose an informed legislative debate. In practice, the renewal of temporary measures 
does not require much legislative effort. For example, the state practice with sunset clauses in the 
1970s and 1980s shows that these provisions were easily renewed without a thorough 
evaluation.91 
The use of sunset clauses has been however criticized in the literature. Inspired by 
political economy literature, commentators have argued that legislators that are mainly motivated 
by a short-run electoral horizon, will tend to adopt policy programs that produce positive short-
term results, even if the long-term effects are not equally positive.92 The use of sunset clauses 
may thus divide the costs of a policy, creating the illusion—in the eyes of citizens and political 
opponents—that the policy is not harmful to the federal budget nor is it predominantly driven by 
certain special interest groups.93 Professor Rebecca Kysar has argued that, in the case of tax law, 
temporary legislation can create rent-seeking opportunities for certain interest groups and be 
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Emergencies, 25 MINN. J. OF INT’ L L. 29 (2016). 
91 See Bickle supra note 62, at 223. 
92 Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L. J. 477, 490 (1992). 
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used to reduce the estimated revenue costs since such calculation would only take the sunset 
period into account.94  
 
3. Terminate Ineffective Policies – Empirical Evidence 
 
There are few empirical studies on the value of temporary legislative instruments for policy 
termination.95 The existing ones have demonstrated that sunset clauses can be used to introduce 
enhanced legislative flexibility, particularly in areas characterized by risks and uncertain 
conditions.96 The implementation of sunset clauses has nonetheless proved to be challenging. In 
2010, the Bertelsmann Stiftung conducted an empirical study analyzing the implementation of 
sunset clauses in the United States, Australia, Switzerland, and Germany.97 Sunset clauses 
appeared to have been often employed in these countries to gather consensus regarding 
legislative and policy change and improve parliamentary control of regulatory policies. 
However, this study also found a tendency to renew these clauses, not always because of their 
superior effectiveness but because of the lack of adequate evaluations.98  
A study conducted in the late 1980s also concluded that sunset clauses enacted at state 
level tended to be renewed on a regular basis. Multiple reasons explain this renewal, including 
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the difficulty to evaluate carefully all these clauses, considering their abundance and short 
duration periods.99 More recently, Professor Jason Oh modelled the renewal of sunset clauses on 
different grounds, arguing that the renewal is often dependent on the underlying permanent 
policy and its acceptability to certain key legislative actors. According to this empirical study, 
the renewal or expiration of sunset clauses is explained by how the preferences of actors changed 
between the moment of enactment and the “sunset”.100 
In brief, there are examples and empirical studies that show that sunset clauses have been 
used to introduce legislative change, particularly when it was difficult to gather initial consensus 
to change the status quo. This aspect of temporary legislation has also been analyzed extensively 
in the literature.101 Temporary legislative measures have been used more or less successfully in 
different contexts and jurisdictions as consensus-finders. Although they promised a temporary 
solution which could be easily reverted, in many cases, these clauses were renewed. This is what 
this Article calls “the one foot in the door effect”. While it is true that the renewal of sunset 
clauses has at times revealed deficiencies in their implementation process, this does not mean 
that these measures should not be employed. As I have argued in my previous work, sunset 
clauses and other temporary legislative instruments are valuable instruments provided that they 
are enacted according to a clear framework and goals, are evaluated and reviewed on the grounds 
of the results of these evaluations.102 As the next Section explains, temporary legislative 
instruments can be employed to help legislators introduce some flexibility in the lawmaking 
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process, test the effectiveness of new provisions, and initiate new legislative paths based on the 
gathered evidence. 
 
4. Gather Evidence 
 
In this Article I suggest an evidence-based approach based on the use of temporary 
measures that disrupt path-dependent practices and help overcome stakeholders’ resistance to 
change. Evidence of the effectiveness of new practices should ideally reeducate them, convince 
them to change their entrenched habits, and produce a “cooling effect” in politics and special 
interests.103  
Kendra’s law and the USA Patriot Act included sunset clauses, but there are many other 
temporary legislative and policy measures which can promote policy and legislative termination 
and create room for legislative renewal. This is the case of pilot programs, experimental policies, 
and experimental legislation. These instruments allow legislators and policymakers to gather 
evidence of the effectiveness of a new policy either by enabling experimentation through the 
derogation of existing provisions or by promoting policy variation or the creation of “states-as-
laboratories”. In federations, state policy experiments can contribute to the long-term stability of 
a federal program or statute because they allow states to accommodate the implementation of a 
federal statute to their local needs.104 For example, in the past decades, states have conducted 
numerous experiments with Medicaid.105 States applied for waivers so as to derogate from 
                                                     
103 Cass Sunstein, Simpler: The Future of Functional Government, BU Law’s Symposium on America’s 
Political Dysfunction: Constitutional Connections, Causes, and Cures, B.U. School of Law (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.bu.edu/law/news/sunstein.shtml  
104 See generally on state experimentation Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as 
Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 1673 (2011); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of 
Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 Emory L.J. 1333 (2009); Virginia Gray, 
Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 129 (2014). 
105 See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Timothy Callaghan, Why States Expand Medicaid: Party, Resources, and 
History, 38 J. OF HEALTH POL’Y L. 1023 (2013). See also Robert F. Rich, Cinthia L. Deye & Elizabeth Masur, The 
federal rules and customize the implementation of Medicaid. This approach has been used not 
only to accommodate federalist concerns but also to allow states to innovate.  
 
III.  EVIDENCE-BASED ENTRENCHMENT 
 
As Cass Sunstein argues in his book Simpler, “pleading for empirical foundations seems 
obvious, as relying on sense rather than nonsense. But the temptation to favor intuition over 
information is strong.”106 In addition to the tendency to favor intuition, the tendency to favor the 
status quo and vested interests, instead of scientific evidence is also strong. Moreover, legislative 
entrenchment and disentrenchment can be legitimized by public participation: laws stay because 
“people like them”. But people do not always like the truth.  
Evidence-based instruments can test whether entrenched rules and policies are the most 
effective ones. The purpose of evidence-based lawmaking is to “create better law—law informed 
by reality.”107 “Evidence-based lawmaking” relies on an interdisciplinary and incrementalist 
approach to law that seeks effective and customized solutions for legal and policy problems.108  
In this Part, I complete this Article’s approach to legislative entrenchment and legislative 
reform by arguing that laws should persist mainly because there is evidence that they “work.” I 
refer in this Part to the use of evidence as a limitation of the legislative mandate. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
State Children’s Health Insurance Program: An Administrative Experiment in Federalism, U. ILL. L. REV. 107 
(2004). 
106 See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 5-6. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN & RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
107 Rachlinski, see supra note 19, at 910. 
108 For a recent and thorough analysis of pragmatic incrementalism, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The 
Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543 (2010). 
A.  Evidence-based law 
 
In the past decades, there has been a growing tendency to promote evidence-based practices in 
medicine, social services, education, and, more recently, in law.109 Litigation, legal profession 
law, corporate law, criminal law, intellectual property law, and, not surprisingly, health law all 
want to become evidence-based.110 The basic idea behind an evidence-based approach is that 
medical treatments, policies, and even legal provisions are expected to reflect the most effective 
solution for a problem. This perspective draws from the common understanding of evidence-
based medicine as “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in 
making decisions about the care of individual patients.”111  
Evidence-based practice is a paradigm or model that aims to replace the traditional 
intuitive,112 experiential or opinion-based methodology by empirical evidence.113 Evidence-based 
law and policymaking aims to use “the best available research and data on program results” and 
focus on “what works,” that is, it aims to enact laws and policies that incorporate the programs 
that have been positively evaluated. This approach is designed to reduce wasteful spending, 
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expand successful programs (e.g., new Medicare payment models delivering the best outcomes), 
and improve governmental accountability.114 
In the context of law and policymaking, evidence-based practices have attempted to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of programs and laws by embracing comparative effectiveness 
research and different forms of legal experimentation including the implementation of pilot 
programs or the use of traditional state waivers. An evidence-based health care reform, for 
example, provides for a robust environment for comparative effectiveness research and 
systematic reviews. Evidence-based practices assist practitioners, policymakers, and legislators 
in the quest for answers for questions such as: Who will benefit from a new rule? Who might be 
harmed? Is this the most cost and quality effective treatment?115 
Evidence-based lawmaking is a problem-solving approach to policy and legislation guided 
by the need to find the best available evidence for a problem. The reliance on evidence and 
expertise is far from being a novelty in law: experts have played for decades an important role in 
courts, assisting judges in their decisions regarding complex evidence.116 With evidence-based 
practices legislators and agencies initiate a transition from relying on opinions, anecdote, 
external evidence and external expertise to the comparative study of effectiveness of policies and 
laws.  
Comparative effectiveness research was until recently a technocratic research field. In the 
last years, research on comparative effectiveness emerged from the evidence-based medicine 
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movement.117 Before the enactment of the ACA, section 804 of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 established the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative 
Effectiveness Research essentially to coordinate comparative effectiveness research across the 
federal government.118 The mission of this Council was to promote optimum coordination of 
research on health services.119 Although this goal might sound reasonable at first blush, 
comparative effectiveness research has been regarded with suspicion as “the intriguing wild care 
of health care reform.”120  
 
B.  Temporary Legislative Instruments and Evidence Gathering 
 
In the context of health care reform in the United States, temporary measures such as 
pilot programs have been employed not only to introduce controversial and ad hoc provisions, 
but also and more importantly, to experiment with slow but effective changes in longstanding 
and path-dependent practices. To illustrate, the ACA has initiated several pilot programs to 
abandon the expensive and outdated fee-for-service concept in Medicare. The fee-for-service or 
traditional Medicare refers to the practice of reimbursing hospitals for their “reasonable costs” 
and physicians for their “reasonable charges” for all “medically necessary care.”121 The ACA 
now requires the Secretary of Health of Human Services to “establish, test, and evaluate a five-
year pilot program for integrated care” and directs the Secretary to issue recommendations 
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regarding the expansion of this pilot program. In addition, the ACA has also opened the door to 
pilot testing of new “bundled payment models.122  
Pilot programs are temporary measures that are designed to test the effectiveness of a new 
policy. Pilot programs test different solutions for policy questions for which Congress does not 
have a definitive answer (e.g., how to render health care organizations more accountable, how to 
reduce Medicare costs without affecting the quality of health care services or how to promote 
investment in primary care and innovation).123 Pilot programs have been introduced for example 
to change the current Medicare payment system which is based on the inefficient fee-for-service. 
An example of this experimental use of pilot programs can be found in the National Pilot 
Program on Payment Bundling. 124 This pilot introduces a new approach to payment which aims 
to improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services. Instead of receiving 
individual payments for small services regarding the same condition (e.g., a pneumonia or a hip 
replacement surgery), a subset of Medicare providers and health facilities will receive a single 
payment for an episode of acute care in a hospital, followed by post-acute care in another 
setting.125 This will potentially avoid waste and discourage unnecessary and expensive services. 
Payments are therefore estimated beforehand based on expected costs for clinically episodes of 
care.126 Bundled payment should include clear quality metrics focused on desired clinical 
outcomes that providers must achieve to maximize their payment.   
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At first sight, the ACA seems to be a monolithic national policy which is impervious to 
change.127 While this is not totally wrong, the ACA has created room for policy change, 
customization, and learning. With the ACA’s State Innovation Waiver (§1332), commonly 
known as “2017 waivers” or “Wyden waivers,” states are allowed to deviate from a number of 
key provisions of the ACA and experiment with their own solutions for health care spending.128  
Waivers are instruments of congressional delegation of authority to the executive branch 
to authorize selective—and frequently experimental—deviations from the law.129 Waivers are 
not incompatible with the entrenchment of the framework established by the ACA. Rather, these 
instruments are susceptible of gradually improving it by allowing states to try new policy 
alternatives that serve the same goals (and might even be more effective and efficient than the 
ACA), as long as they provide similar coverage. States can waive, for example, the individual 
mandate as prescribed in the ACA and enact instead an alternative that expands or narrows 
exemptions, increasing or decreasing penalties, or implementing a late-enrollment penalty.130 
These waivers are not a carte blanche to overturn the ACA. Instead, at the resemblance of the 
Medicaid waivers, states can use these waivers to design systems for expanding and delivering 
health care coverage that could look very different from the ACA. The federal government 
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would allow states to restructure their approach to health care reform by waiving and replacing 
some key provisions of the law. 
 State waivers and policy experiments are mirror images. Policy experimentation is a tool 
of policy analysis that allows states to test the effectiveness of a particular policy.131 The idea 
that federalism enables experimentation and the pursuit of multiple learning opportunities is far 
from being recent. Justice Brandeis “states-as-laboratories” metaphor has been interpreted in the 
literature not only as a plea for federalism,132 but also as a reflection of his hope on 
“scientifically based public policy.”133 State experimentation is also potentially advantageous for 
states outside the experiment and even for the federal level since they can learn from the 
obtained results.134 The federal level can also learn from state experiments and, to some extent, 
the ACA seems to have been based on the “Massachusetts experiment,” the health care 
legislation passed by the state in 2006, which created different health insurance pools.135  
If states choose different policy approaches to manage the costs of quality and access to 
healthcare, then they might learn which approaches work and which do not. These simultaneous 
experiments generate information about the effects of certain health care solutions which would 
never be produced under a single and uniform single national policy.” According to the 
literature, modern state experimentation appears to reflect the pragmatism of John Dewey who 
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perceived policy experimentation as a dynamic and evidence-based approach to public 
governance.136 
Several states have used evidence-based strategies to promote the implementation of 
programs through the use of financial incentives, notably in the field of criminal law and policy, 
education, and health care reform.137 An example is the Wisconsin Treatment Alternatives and 
Diversion program which funds alternatives to prosecution and incarceration of nonviolent 
offenders with histories of alcohol.138 In some states, legislatures have gone beyond the mere use 
of funding instruments, requiring that certain state agencies implement only those programs that 
demonstrate at least a minimum standard of effectiveness.139 To illustrate, in 2012, Michigan 
mandated that state departments of Community Health, Human Services, and Education to 
allocate funding to home visiting programs that have proven to be effective.140  
 
C.  Shortcomings of Evidence-Based Lawmaking 
 
Evidence-based policy and lawmaking has become highly politicized in the last years. 
Scholars had expected that this fact-based policy would have ideally helped finding a consensus 
between conservative and liberal analysts based on the available evidence rather than opinions or 
ideology. Instead, comparative effectiveness research has become “short-circuited, accelerated, 
and warped.”141 Indeed, evidence-based lawmaking is not perfect. And it is not easy to practice.  
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Evidence-based legislation involves the science of “muddling through” a vast amount of 
evidence. Both legislators and physicians need to rely here on frameworks in order to know what 
evidence should inform their judgments.142 The legal literature has therefore cautioned against 
the excessive use of comparative effective research. Richard Saver has argued that the 
investment in this approach can prove to be costly and disappointing in the long-run because it 
does not insulate the obtained evidence from the pressure exerted by interest groups. 143. 
Moreover, in the specific case of health care reform, it is still unclear how the evidence of 
effectiveness will be used to transform legislation and improve the effectiveness of this area.144 
Ultimately, the success of this form of evidence-based approach might depend on the 
engagement of different political constituencies.145  
In the specific case of state policy experimentation, it is clear that these experiments 
contain numerous caveats: these policy experiments are often not randomized,146 they do not take 
place in a laboratory under controlled conditions, and they might not say much about 
causality.147 The transplant of the lessons learned in a state might also not be possible, given the 
socioeconomic divergence between states.148 In addition, state experimentation waivers have not 
always been used to test the effectiveness of new policies. Instead, states have employed state 
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waivers to voice their dissenting positions, endangering the distributive objectives of federal 
welfare policies.149 
In brief, pilot programs, state experimentation, and mandated evidence-based programs 
are just the beginning of a revolution in law and policymaking that aims to promote the 
entrenchment of core values and legislative frameworks while allowing for the gathering of 
evidence of the effectiveness of their different parts. While this evidence of effectiveness is still 
far from perfect, it can perhaps translate a shift in the paradigm of legislative entrenchment from 





We know that we cannot trust numbers.150 Empirical research and the general quest for 
evidence can also be easily biased. And for every number we find, someone will be willing to 
produce different ones. But evidence can constitute a more scientific limitation to the powers of 
legislative mandate than legislators’ opinions and intuitions. At a time characterized by concerns 
regarding the proliferation of “fake news,” the dismissal of science and the propagation of 
“alternative facts,” evidence-based legislation is more needed than ever before. The gathered 
knowledge and evidence utilization are not solutions but rather incremental processes which 
naturally influence decision-making, even if they are not always actively used to change 
policies.151  
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This Article explained that, in some cases, evidence-based legislation is not introduced 
because there is a great deal of resistance towards novel—and, hopefully, more effective—
legislative solutions. Drawing on the literature and the study of two cases, I argued that the 
adoption of temporary legislative instruments could offer a solution for these type of situations. 
Sunset clauses, pilot programs, and state policy experiments can promote reform by testing new 
legislative solutions and gathering evidence of their comparative effectiveness. They can be “the 
one foot in the door” in legal reform that allow the proponents of legislative change to advance 
policy reforms.  
Considering the lack of empirical evidence, it is important to be cautious when 
generalizing the claims made in this Article. Temporary and experimental legislative instruments 
have in the past been employed to gather consensus among those who oppose legislative 
reform.152 This compromise occurred because these measures offered by definition the promise 
of temporality and renewed legislative oversight. Nevertheless, as the renewal of temporary 
legislation becomes more common, their usefulness as “disrupters” of legislative entrenchment 
might become more reduced. Furthermore, the evidence-based approach developed in this article 
is not exempt from shortcomings. Sunset clauses, experimental policies and regulations, and 
pilot programs are not impermeable to political and interest groups capture.153 Evidence-based 
instruments can be employed to question the effectiveness of entrenched paths, even if their 
adoption might open the door to the establishment of new long-term policies. This ability to 
embrace legislative change first on a temporary basis and then later on a more permanent basis is 
susceptible of promoting dialogue and stimulating the rationalization of legislation. This article 
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offers therefore a contribution to this dialogue in an attempt to complement the legacy of the 
work of John Eule on legislative entrenchment.  
 
 
 
 
